1. faiVLive Background: The motivation for the faiVLive experiment is discussing what to think about microcredit impact given all the research in recent years. If you can't make it, or if you can, here's your quick cheat sheet to the recent research. Of course it's starts with the average impact of microcredit being very modest. A Bayesian Hierarchical model look at the data confirms those findings. But there is important heterogeneity hidden within those average effects--"gung-ho" microborrowers do see substantial gains from increased access to credit. It's also true that these are mostly studies of expanding access to formal credit, not introducing it. That's hard to measure, but we can get a cleaner view of the value of credit when it gets taken away from most everyone--and that shows significant benefits, though through a somewhat unexpected channel: casual labor wages. Changes in labor wages can matter a lot for understanding the impact of a program, even entirely masking any benefits of an intervention with evidence that it makes a substantial difference in many contexts. And it's clear that changes in labor supply are quickly passed through into labor rates--in this case, the markets seem to be working fairly well. But it's not just labor markets. When microcredit affects local markets--by increasing or decreasing the supply of tradeable goods--the benefits may be substantial but mostly captured by the people who aren't using microcredit (what economists call general equilibrium effects). Which makes it all the more important to understand local market dynamics, especially when in many cases microenterprises are operating in sectors where supply exceeds demand. That being said, microcredit is a cheap intervention relative to other options. And it's possible we could increase the returns to microcredit for more reluctant microenterprise operators by boosting their aspirations. Or perhaps by doing better targeting of lending. But is it worth targeting? Households do seem to do a pretty good job of allocating access to capital to its most productive use within the household, and the gung-ho entrepreneurs are benefiting even without the expense of targeting. 2. MicroDigitalFinance and Household Finance: I suppose all of the above would qualify here as well, but here's a bunch of different new stuff, starting with the digital side of things. There are two new papers about the effects of SMEs adopting digital payments. In Kenya, an encouragement intervention led to 78% of treated restaurants and 28% of pharmacies adopting Lipa Na m-Pesa, and consequent increases in access to credit. In Mexico, a different kind of encouragement--the government distributed massive numbers of debit cards as part of the Progresa program--led small retailers to adopt POS terminals. That led to wealthier customers shifting some of their purchasing to these smaller retailers, and increased sales and profits for the retailers, but not an increase in employees or wages paid. On a side note, it's curious that the smaller shock of debit card distribution (pushing debit card ownership to 54% of households) had a large effect on retailers but the larger shock of m-Pesa being adopted by practically everyone has not led to more Lipa Na m-Pesa adoption. A few weeks ago I featured a puzzle in savings from two savings encouragement experiments--the encouragement worked but savings plateau at a level well below what would seem optimal. Isabelle Guerin sent me a couple of papers that I'm still reviewing that might help explain why, but this week I stumbled across another example. The US CFPB, back in the days when it was allowed to do stuff and wasn't a hollow shell of existential dread, ran an experiment using American Express Serve cards and the "Reserve" functionality. They find that encouraging savings works--people boost their savings--but that the savings plateau after the 12 week encouragement and stay at roughly the same level for 16 months. That's consistent with the results from India and Chile but not with a model of accumulating lump sums or precautionary savings. You would expect among this population that they would experience a shock in that 16 month period and draw down the savings. Participants say they reduce payday loan use, but frankly I don't believe any claims about payday behavior that isn't based on administrative data (and it doesn't make sense if balances were stable). And finally because I want to encourage this behavior, Maria May sent me an interesting new paper on offering microcredit borrowers flexibility in repayment--customers get two "skip payment" coupons to use during the term of their 12 month loan cycle. Consistent with the much earlier work from Field et al, it yields more investment from borrowers, better outcomes and lower defaults.
3. Evidence-Based Policy: I noted last week that GiveWell, where I have served on the board since it's founding, released it's Top Charity recommendations. One of those is GiveDirectly. GiveWell, as is it's wont, wrote up some details of it's analysis of GiveDirectly, particularly about spillovers from cash transfers. That analysis was significantly informed by a forthcoming paper on general equilibrium effects and spillovers from one of GiveDirectly's programs that GiveWell was given access to even though it is not yet public. Berk Ozler took issue with that. And GiveWell responded. I have nothing whatsoever to do with GiveWell's research process or conclusions, but I was heavily involved advising GiveWell on its response to Berk's questions.